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State-Market Relations in the Perspective of Original Institutionalism
*
 
 
This article summarises the main arguments of a critical literature that radically questions the 
neoclassical economic theory of state-market relations and identifies the fundamental 
methodological weaknesses of this school of thought. As an alternative, it presents an 
interpretation of the methodology on which Original Institutionalism, the political economy 
movement launched by Thorstein Veblen, is based. The article proposes an understanding of 
the economy and markets as emerging institutions, reflecting a metaphysics of social systems 
that views the latter as complex, self-organised and interactive processes. The state-market 
relationship is analysed in light of this institutional interactivity. Highlighting the co-evolution 
of state and market, the article attributes a central role to industrial policy in economic 
development processes. 
Keywords: state; institutionalism; institutions; market; industrial policy; state-market relation.  
 
 
Introduction 
From World War II to the 1970s, a type of capitalist economy prevailed in the West that was 
known as a mixed economy, an economy in which the state regulated markets fairly tightly, 
redistributed the income generated through taxation and social benefits, protected citizens 
from some risks and owned companies in some sectors of the economy.  
State intervention in the functioning of markets was justified by the notion that markets 
do not, in practice, work exactly in accordance with the General Equilibrium Model (GEM) 
proposed in the 19
th
 century by Leon Walras, one of the founders of the neoclassical current. 
Vilfredo Pareto, his disciple, developed Walƌas͛s ideas through a particular approach to 
individual preferences: preferences determiŶe the iŶdiǀidual͛s ĐhoiĐes aŶd ultiŵately his 
well-being; and the utility that an individual attributes to goods cannot be measured or 
compared with that of another, but merely ordered. Starting from these assumptions, he 
defined a principle which, in its strongest version, claims the following: ͞The group of 
individuals increases its welfare in moving from a to b if at least one individual is better off in 
ď aŶd Ŷo iŶdiǀidual is ǁoƌse off͟ ;AĐoĐella, ϮϬϬϬ: ϮϯͿ. Although this is a ǀalue judgeŵeŶt, the 
͞Paƌeto pƌiŶĐiple͟ was enshrined by economists as their ͞effiĐieŶĐǇ͟ ĐoŶĐept. Indeed, 
economists went even further and adopted a foƌŵulatioŶ kŶoǁŶ as the ͞Paƌeto optimum,͟ 
iŵpliĐitlǇ suggestiŶg that this iŶǀolǀed a desiƌaďle soĐial state: ͞A soĐial state a is Pareto 
                                                 
* Article published in RCCS 95 (December 2011). 
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͚optiŵal͛ if iŶ ŵoǀiŶg fƌoŵ that state to any other state it is not possible to increase the 
ǁelfaƌe of oŶe ŵeŵďeƌ of soĐietǇ ǁithout ǁoƌseŶiŶg the ĐoŶditioŶ of at least oŶe otheƌ͟ 
(ibidem: 24). Moreover, neoclassical theory ended up establishing a correspondence 
between the Pareto optimum and the equilibrium of a perfectly competitive market. This 
correspondence was expressed in two theorems which, applied to a market system, stated 
the following:  
1. In an economic system with perfect competition and complete markets, a competitive 
equilibrium, if it exists, will be Pareto optimal. 
2. If there are complete markets and certain conditions are met regarding individual utility 
fuŶĐtioŶs […] aŶd pƌoduĐtioŶ fuŶĐtioŶs [...], eǀeƌǇ Paƌeto-optimal state can be realised as the 
outcome of a competitive equilibrium through an appropriate redistribution of resources 
(initial endowments) among individuals. (ibidem: 72-3) 
Based on the first theorem, neoclassical theory supports public intervention whenever 
ŵaƌkets fail to deliǀeƌ aŶ effiĐieŶt alloĐatioŶ of ƌesouƌĐes. This is kŶoǁŶ as a ͞ŵaƌket 
failure.͟ Within certain limits, the second theorem justifies public intervention in the 
redistribution of income to promote equity without compromising efficiency.
1
  
With the rise of neoliberal thinking in the 1970s, it was to be expected that the Austrian 
school (Menger, Hayek), which was very critical of public intervention in markets, would 
replace the synthesis achieved by Paul Samuelson between his (revisionist) interpretation of 
the work of Keynes and neoclassical theory. But the fact is that the work of Hayek had 
always been relegated to the background in university economics departments. Chang gives 
a plausible explanation for this:  
Given that the Austrian-libertarian tradition had been on the margin of intellectual 
respectability until the 1970s, the neo-liďeƌals Đould Ŷot affoƌd to do ǁithout the ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ͛ 
respectability that neoclassical economics carried, in return for which the Austrian-libertarian 
tradition supplied the popular appeal that neoclassical economics could never dream of 
supplying itself (whoever died in the name of Pareto Optimality or General Equilibrium?). 
(2002: 541) 
Thus, instead of an academic revolution led by the Austrian school, there has been, since 
the 1970s, a reform of neoclassical theory designed to contain, or even revert, traditional 
                                                 
1
 The laĐk of ƌealisŵ iŶ Paƌeto͛s fiƌst theoƌeŵ is oďǀious. I highlight oŶe of the ǁeakest assuŵptioŶs of this 
axiom: the existence of a system of complete markets, i.e., all economic activity is fully regulated through 
perfect markets. However, reality shows us that it is not like that, and that externalities, public goods, 
transaction costs and asymmetrical information are typical situations of real markets. As for the second 
theorem, it is important to emphasise that it is not possible to separate the resource allocation function from 
the income redistribution function. For a more detailed critique of these theorems, see Acocella (2000: ch. 5). 
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arguments in favour of state intervention. Controlling political power, and using the 
narrative about the unsuitability of Keynesian policies to confront the oil crisis of 1973, 
supporters of the neoliberal reshaping of society mobilized neoclassical theory in their 
favour. If the latter was already aloof from the actual problems confronted by political 
decision makers, from this moment on it gradually turned into a sterile formalism. At the 
same time, the traditional analysis of market failures was modified in order to sanction a 
more restricted number of public interventions,
2
 on the one hand, and on the other, 
Đoŵpleted ǁith a Ŷeǁ doŵaiŶ, that of ͞state failuƌes.͟ In this case, the limitations or 
perverse effects of public policies began to be theorized.  
Thus, from the 1980s, there appeared a renovated version of neoclassical theory based 
oŶ Walƌas͛s conceptual framework. Inspired by late 19th century mechanical physics, the 
General Equilibrium Model (GEM) only recognises the action of individuals as a source of 
causality, thereby ignoring the complex systemic nature of markets. Moreover, to sustain 
the convergence of markets towards equilibrium, it only considers negative feedback effects 
as a consequence of the action of economic agents. Despite its evident weaknesses, 
neoclassical economic theory has remained hegemonic in economics programmes and 
textbooks. Nevertheless, innovative research has been carried out on the margins of the 
dominant paradigm. One minority stream that has been revived in recent decades is Original 
Institutionalism, the form of institutionalism initiated by Thorstein Veblen (Hodgson, 2004). 
The present article is affiliated to this stream.  
The first section highlights some of the critiques of neoclassical theory and identifies its 
fundamental methodological weaknesses. The second section briefly summarises the 
methodology underlying Original Institutionalism, while the third section develops an 
institutionalist understanding of the market and the state-market relation based on a 
metaphysics of process and emergent ontology.
3
 The conclusion discusses one fundamental 
implication of this institutionalist approach, namely the central place that the state and 
                                                 
2
 The existence of externalities – actions of an economic nature that generate (physical and/or economic) 
effects that affect other agents that do not receive compensation – is one of the most debated market failures. 
For a more detailed critique of externality theory, see Vatn and Bromley (1997).   
3
 For pƌoĐess ŵetaphǇsiĐs all ƌealitǇ is ͞ĐhaŶge.͟ ͞Foƌ the pƌoĐess philosopher, process has priority over 
product – ďoth oŶtologiĐallǇ aŶd episteŵiĐallǇ͟ ;‘esĐheƌ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϲͿ. Moƌeoǀeƌ, the ŵost ďasiĐ pƌoĐesses teŶd to 
be organized into open systems. With evolution they give rise to new systems, endowed with new properties, 
which include those of the lower level. Thus, all reality, including sociocultural reality, is organized into 
emergent levels, which are autonomous but necessarily interdependent. This is a process-based emergentist 
ontology (Campbell, 2009). 
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industrial policy occupy in the development processes that have taken place in recent 
decades.  
1. A Critique of the Foundations of Neoclassical Theory 
Three decades after it was demonstrated that it was impossible to induce a unique stable 
equilibrium in a GEM distant from economic reality, the textbooks used for teaching 
economics, particularly public economics, have remained immune to the devastating 
critiques that have accumulated (Rizvi, 2006). For example, Kirman (1989) shows that, 
instead of convergence to equilibrium, instability is part of the model, even when we admit 
that consumers have identical preferences. Ackerman describes the intellectual failure of the 
general equilibrium model in these terms:  
The basic finding aďout iŶstaďilitǇ […] is that almost any continuous pattern of price 
movements can occur in a general equilibrium model. […] Not oŶlǇ does geŶeƌal eƋuiliďƌiuŵ 
fail to be reliably stable; its dynamics can be as bad as you want them to be. (2004: 16) 
In fact, the critique of the foundations of neoclassical theory not only destroys the idea 
that a market system tends towards a state of unique stable equilibrium, it also goes further. 
Using models of interaction between economic agents, and incorporating non-linearity into 
the equations, it arrived at results with properties identical to those of complex physical 
phenomena, such as the formation and bursting of speculative bubbles.
4
 Thus, Ackerman 
concludes:  
TheoƌetiĐal aŶalǇsis to date […] has shoǁŶ that stability is simply not an endogenous 
ŵatheŵatiĐal pƌopeƌtǇ of ŵaƌket eĐoŶoŵies uŶdeƌ all iŶitial ĐoŶditioŶs. […] If it is so diffiĐult 
to demonstrate that stability is endogenous to a market economy, perhaps it is exogenous. 
(2004: 30) 
Therefore, instead of trying to explain the functioning of markets from the behaviour of 
individuals alone, in production or consumption, it makes sense to relate those behaviours 
to realities which influence or partly determine them, particularly forms of extra-price 
coordination and so-called institutions. As we shall see in the next section, this is not just 
about finding exogenous stability factors (outside the market) for the simple reason that 
such factors, existing through a necessary relationship with the activities of economic 
agents, are also part of the institution that is the market.  
                                                 
4
 It should be noted that central banks continue to do simulations with general equilibrium models, the so-
called Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models (Tovar, 2008). 
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The integration of the connection between market agents, institutional norms, companies 
and other organizations into economic analysis constitutes a crucial demarcation line 
between neoclassical economics and other theoretical currents, such as the institutionalist 
political economy launched by Veblen. Within neoclassical economics, market analysis takes 
as reference a preference-focused individual, behaving according to a calculative rationality 
that aims to maximise the use of the goods and services that he consumes. The market is 
seen as the set of exchanges of a homogeneous product without the intervention of money. 
On the contrary, institutional political economy assumes the sociocultural nature of the 
market, seeing it as an emergent reality, structured into different levels of organization and 
complexity.
5
 For example, while neoclassical economics treats companies as functions of 
production, institutionalist political economy sees the company as an organization with 
properties that are not reducible to those of the individuals that constitute it, and as a 
central actor in the market.
6
 According to this logic, the market is a complex social system, 
made up of relations between individuals, companies, institutional norms and culture. It is a 
sociocultural system that emerges through causal interactions between these different 
realities.  
We should recall that introductory economics textbooks do not discuss the reality of 
markets beyond the well-known supply and demand graphs. Foƌ this ƌeasoŶ, HodgsoŶ͛s 
perplexity is well justified when he claims: ͞No feǁeƌ thaŶ thƌee Noďel Lauƌeates haǀe Ŷoted 
the paradoxical omission of discussion of markets institutions in economics literature͟ (2008: 
251).  
Neoclassical theory also presents great weaknesses on the level of the individual.  Since 
Lionel Robbins, economists have assumed that economic behaviour translates into a rational 
choice of the means to achieve ends that are considered a given. Ultimately, this is a 
calculative instrumental rationality, applicable to any field where optimization is subject to 
limitations, whether these are resources, rules or otheƌs͛ behaviours (Smith, 2008). The fact 
                                                 
5
 ͞EŵeƌgeŶtisŵ Đlaiŵs that a ǁhole is ͚something ŵoƌe thaŶ the suŵ of its paƌts͛, or has properties that cannot 
be understood in terms of the properties of the parts. Thus, emergentism rejects the idea that there is any 
fundamental level of ontology. It holds that the best understanding of complex systems must be sought at the 
level of the structure, behavior and laws of the whole system and that science may require a plurality of 
theories (different theories for different domains) to acquire the greatest predictive/explanatory power and 
the deepest uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.͟ (Silberstein, 2002: 81).   
6
 It is important to remember that the New Institutionalism is quite different from Original Institutionalism. The 
former was launched by Oliver Williamson (1975) with the purpose of filling gaps in neoclassical thought. For 
Williamson, institutions frame and foster individual behaviours but the interdependency between the two 
levels is ignored. For a critique of New Institutionalism, see Vira (1997). 
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that rational choice can be easily formalized in mathematical terms was decisive for the 
academic respectability that it acquired, and this is probably one of the reasons why other 
disciplines imported it.  
However, in the mid 20
th
 century, Herbert Simon (1959), going beyond the critiques of 
the theoƌizatioŶ of eĐoŶoŵiĐ ageŶts͛ pƌefeƌeŶĐes, ĐhalleŶged the ǁaǇ ŶeoĐlassiĐal theoƌǇ 
sees the human mind and rational behaviour. In particular, he stressed the great limitations 
of decision-making processes when alternatives are not fixed from the outset and have to be 
sought out, and also when it is a matter of predicting the consequences of each alternative. 
“iŵoŶ͛s poiŶt of ǀieǁ, ǁhile aĐĐepted ďǇ soŵe ĐuƌƌeŶts of ĐƌitiĐal thiŶkiŶg, has long ceased 
to be relevant given the advances in research into neurophysiology and psychology 
(Damásio, 1999; Bandura, 2001).
7
 In fact, human cognition, constructed through a sociability 
sustained by emotions, is far too complex for the critique of the foundations of neoclassical 
economic theory to concentrate on the computational limitations of the mind and the 
impossibility of accessing all relevant information.  
The institutionalist political economy initiated with Veblen goes deeper. First of all, it 
recognises that human beings only become people through sociability, so that they 
themselves, and the sociocultural environment in which they live, have to be seen as 
interdependent and co-evolving. Moreover, it understands that individual decisions are 
never the result of a utilitarian, atomistic and isolated rationality. Inspired by the 
pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce, Original Institutionalism assumes that human rationality is 
revealed through action, through our way of being in the world (Kilpinen, 2003). According 
to this view, developed especially by John Dewey, means and ends should be seen as 
interdependent and evolving: ͞AŶ eŶd, oƌ effeĐt, sooŶ ďeĐoŵes a ŵeaŶs, or cause, for what 
follows. […] ŶothiŶg happeŶs ǁhiĐh is fiŶal iŶ the seŶse that it is not part of any ongoing 
stƌeaŵ of eǀeŶts͟ ;Whitfoƌd, ϮϬϬϮ: ϯϯϳͿ.  
In fact, human behaviour is not a sequence of discrete decisions in which the choice of 
means is determined and evaluated on the basis of known ends. On the contrary, human 
behaviour is a process in which the ends in sight also depend on the situation at hand and 
the means that are available. This interdependence is clearly visible when new needs, or 
ends, are generated by new technologies. Thus, overcoming the analytical distinction 
                                                 
7
 It should be pointed out that Herbert Simon was strongly influenced by the expansion of cybernetics and by 
computation technology. For a more detailed critique, see Bateira (2006).  
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betweeŶ ŵeaŶs aŶd eŶds, DeǁeǇ͛s pƌagŵatisŵ holds that theǇ aƌe Ŷot sepaƌate. ‘atheƌ, it 
is by experiencing a process in which results are gradually anticipated that human beings 
reveal their rationality, provisionally deliberating about everything that is at stake, i.e. about 
results, ends, means and the course of action itself. This dynamic understanding of human 
rationality is radically incompatible with rational choice theory, even in those of its versions 
that were revised to accommodate the criticisms levelled at it.  
Finally, denying the distinction between positive and normative economics enshrined in 
textbooks, institutionalist political economy adopts a research methodology centred on 
concrete economic processes and on the continual subjection of theory to the test of reality 
and the results of the policies that it proposes. IŶspiƌed ďǇ PeiƌĐe͛s pƌagŵatisŵ, it deǀelops 
͞a self-correcting inquiry [which] produces experimentally determined, operationally 
feasible solutions to specific problems in a dynamic, changing economic system. The result is 
a ďetteƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the ƌealitǇ of ĐhaŶge iŶ the eǀolǀiŶg eĐoŶoŵǇ͟ ;LieďhafskǇ, ϭϵϵϯ: 
749).
8
 For institutionalist economists of this lineage, there is not a positive economics that 
describes, analyses and explains, and a normative economics that makes judgements about 
political options because, in fact, human rationality always involves some kind of judgement, 
albeit provisional, about means and ends (Rescher, 2004).  
 
2. The Methodology of Original Institutionalism 
In order to understand the ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of the ͞iŶdiǀidual–soĐial sǇsteŵ͟ Ŷeǆus, it is esseŶtial 
to go ďaĐk to VeďleŶ͛s iŶstitutioŶalist politiĐal eĐoŶoŵy, a current that was very influential 
and perhaps even mainstream in the US academia in the interwar period. The central ideal 
of VeďleŶ͛s iŶstitutioŶalisŵ is aptly summarised in the following paragraph: 
The growth and mutations of the institutional fabric are an outcome of the conduct of the 
individual members of the group, since it is out of the experience of the individuals, through 
the habituation of individuals that institutions arise; and it is in this same experience that these 
institutions act to direct and define the aims and the end of the conduct. (1994b: 243)  
The last sentence of this quotation shows that, for Veblen, institutions have autonomy 
and a causal power that influences the conduct of individuals. However, he also rejects any 
                                                 
8
 As Miƌoǁki stated, ͞iŶstitutioŶalist eĐoŶoŵiĐs ǁas the offspƌiŶg of aŶ eŶtiƌelǇ distiŶĐt philosophiĐal tƌaditioŶ 
from that which gave rise to neoclassical economics. These two traditions have a profound conflict over their 
ƌespeĐtiǀe iŵages of a ͚science͛, and therefore profouŶdlǇ iŶĐoŵpatiďle iŵages of ͚eĐoŶoŵiĐ ŵaŶ͛ aŶd 
͚rationality͛͟ (1987: 1002). 
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structural determinism when he asserts that ͞iŶstitutioŶs arise͟ out of the sociability of 
individuals. This is one of the rare references to the emergence of institutions in his work. 
Veblen kept aloof from the philosophical debate of his time about the ontological 
relationship between different levels of reality (matter, life, person, society), and did not 
commit himself to a particular ontology of social reality.
9
 Even so, it seems clear that he 
rejected both methodological individualism and methodological collectivism (Hodgson, 
2004: ch. 8). Despite the ambiguities of some of his formulations, Veblen viewed institutions 
as evolving sociocultural entities generated by an upward causality from the action of 
individuals; in the same process, institutions exert a downward causality on iŶdiǀiduals͛ 
ideas, preferences and behaviours.  
Not having joined the debate on the ontology of social reality, Veblen attributed a vague, 
ďƌoad seŶse to the ĐoŶĐept of ͞iŶstitutioŶ,͟ focusing his analysis primarily on structures of a 
cultural nature.
10
 Despite his in-depth discussion of the business firm, he did not concern 
himself with markets. For an analysis of markets in which the systemic dimension of 
institutions is touched upon, we need to revisit the work of Karl Polanyi.  
Karl Polanyi (1944) criticised the classical economists for their atomistic view of the 
individual and for identifying the exchange of products in archaic societies with the market. 
In his view, the institutional transformations of the 19
th
 century in Great Britain, induced by 
the Industrial Revolution, gave rise to a capitalist society that began to treat work, nature 
and money as (fictitious) commodities. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PolaŶǇi, ͞to iŶĐlude theŵ iŶ the ŵaƌket 
mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market͟ 
(1944: 71).  
PolaŶǇi͛s iŶstitutioŶalist peƌspeĐtiǀe ǁas conveyed in more elaborate form in one of his 
last works:  
The fount of the substantive concept [of economics] is the empirical economy. It can be briefly 
(if not engagingly) defined as an instituted process of interaction between man and his 
environment. (1957: 248) 
A study of how empirical economies are instituted should start from the way in which the 
economy acquires unity and stability, that is the interdependence and recurrence of its parts. 
(ibidem: 250) 
                                                 
9
 For a discussion of emergentist ontology in social reality, see Weissman (2000).   
10
 For a discussion of the ontology of cultural structures, see Bateira (2010).  
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Acts of exchange on the personal level produce prices only if they occur under a system of 
price-making markets, an institutional setup which is nowhere created by mere random acts of 
exchange. (ibidem: 251) 
These formulations show that Polanyi distinguished the interpersonal level of mercantile 
exchange from the level of institutional norms of the market. Further, Polanyi considered 
the two levels as simultaneously autonomous and interdependent: ͞iŶstitutioŶal patteƌŶs 
aŶd pƌiŶĐiples of ďehaǀioƌ aƌe ŵutuallǇ adjusted͟ ;PolaŶǇi, ϭϵϰϰ: ϰϵͿ. Therefore, he criticised 
the founding fathers of political economy for ignoring society as an emergent reality 
endowed with its own causality. In this sense, PolaŶǇi͛s thought oŶ ŵaƌkets, the economy 
and society is not only institutionalist but also systemic.  
More recently, the South Korean Ha-Joon Chang has shown the relevance of Original 
Institutionalism in the analysis of development processes. In a recent work, he calls 
attention to the causal relations, both upwards and downwards, involved in the 
development of societies. Recognising that the culture of a non-industrialized society seems 
unfavourable to industrial development, Chang disputes the idea that a ͞Đultuƌal ƌeǀolutioŶ͟ 
is necessary for development to occur:  
Though culture and economic development influence each other, the causality is far stronger 
from the latter to the former; economic development to a large extent creates a culture that it 
needs. Changes in economic structure change the way people live and interact with one 
another, which, in turn, changes the way they understand the world and behave. (2007: 200-
201) 
He accepts that institutional norms and culture shape individuals and influence their 
behaviours. But at the same time, he was able to observe how, in various countries, the 
effects produced by economic policies on the interactions between individuals within 
companies, trade unions, state organizations and on other subsystems of society led to 
changes in those organizations, in the norms of institutions and in culture. It is within this 
conceptual framework of multi-level interdependencies, of an emergentist ontology, that 
the next section explores the concept of the market and its relationship with the state.  
 
3. State and Markets Co-evolve 
Let us begin with a basic question: What are markets? According to the interpretation of 
Original Institutionalism presented in this article, markets are social systems organized for 
the provisioning of a society. They emerge from the interaction between people who, 
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performing specific roles, form organizations, networks of relations and norms regulating 
various activities (Figure 1).
11
  
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The market as complex self-organized system 
              Source: Bateira (2010) 
 
To understand the nature of the market it is necessary to make an analytic distinction 
between individual interactions (the bottom) and the structures that emerge from them, 
namely organizations (business networks, firms, associations or regulatory bodies) and 
institutional norms (laws and regulations, informal rules, business culture). Individuals and 
market structures form a complex self-organized sǇsteŵiĐ ǁhole, iŶ a ǁoƌd, aŶ ͞iŶstitutioŶ.͟ 
This was also the perspective of the social researchers who worked with Polanyi in his late 
years. According to one of them, 
all societies, viewed as self-maintaining social systems, have certain fundamental requirements 
ǁhiĐh ŵust ďe ŵet if theǇ aƌe to ĐoŶtiŶue iŶ opeƌatioŶ. […] Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, all soĐieties iŶ faĐt 
have structures of social relations through which this supply is maintained, and in any given 
case that structure (or structures) is its economy. (Hopkins, 1957: 287) 
At this point, it should be stressed that the institutions of every society differ in terms of 
their nature, complexity and functions, and this entails relations of inclusion. Thus, firms are 
(micro) institutions that operate in the markets, which are (meso) institutions, subsystems of 
                                                 
11
 It is important to remember that markets, understood as institutions, only appeared with long-distance 
sailing and the advent of the nation state.  
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the economy. The latter is the (macro) institution that ensures the provision of both market 
and non-market goods and services to society (Figure 2).
12
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This systemic view clearly shows that the provisioning of a society also depends to a large 
extent on non-market production, both public and private (Williams, 2005). We cannot insist 
too much on the fact that markets depend on the non-market economy, at least through the 
services that families provide to their members working in the market sub-system (Ortiz, 
2002). Thus, non-market activity in any economy cannot be seen as a vestige of the past or 
as a minor complement to modern markets.  
From this point of view, each market and the system of markets as a whole only exist in 
interaction with the state. In fact, not only are some markets created ab initio by the state, 
no market functions without the normative framework that the state establishes and 
enforces. Thus the emergence of any market takes place within relations of interdependence 
                                                 
12
 See Polanyi: ͞The iŶstitutiŶg of the eĐoŶoŵiĐ pƌoĐess ǀests that pƌoĐess ǁith uŶitǇ aŶd staďilitǇ; it pƌoduĐes a 
structure with a definite function in society͟ (1957: 249, my italics). 
Figure 2 – Society as a differentiated sociocultural system 
             Source: Bateira (2010) 
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with the state, as well as with other markets, non-market production and the remaining 
institutions of society (Figure 3).
13
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Given that institutions are processes (flows) organized by causalities involving recursively 
interdependent structures and individuals, it makes no sense to speak of market equilibrium. 
                                                 
13
 It is not possible to give a full explanation of my concept of the market within the limits of this text. I shall 
merely point out that it is a multi-level system that includes not only the process of appropriation that arises 
from the purchase and sale of goods and services, but also processes of production, distribution and 
consumption. On this point, see Bateira (2010: 163-174).  
Figure 3 – The market and its interdependencies 
             Source: Bateira (2010) 
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This notion was imported from mechanical physics, and cannot obviously be applied to social 
reality. Even so, the relative stability of the organization of the different processes 
constituting a market can and should be emphasised. The effects of negative feedback 
(buffering) that exist in all societies contribute to this stability, particularly the inertia that 
cultural structures introduce into the life of individuals and organizations (Veblen, 1994a).  
This interactive view of the nature and functioning of markets points to the inadequacy of 
the endogenous/exogenous dichotomy, an analytical tool much used in mainstream 
economic theory. One example that emphasises the advantage of the interactivist approach, 
in this case in analysing the integration of a national economy into the global economy, is 
given by Campbell:  
IŶteƌŶatioŶal pƌessuƌes […] aƌe ŵediated ďǇ alƌeadǇ eǆistiŶg doŵestiĐ pƌaĐtiĐes. Neǁ pƌaĐtiĐes 
originating outside a country are translated, layered or otherwise recombined with nationally 
speĐifiĐ ŵetatƌaditioŶs that haǀe ďeeŶ iŶheƌited fƌoŵ the past. […] internationalization is a 
simultaneous move to universalism (convergence) and particularism (divergence). (2007: 181-
182) 
In this institutionalist view of society, the state occupies the place of meta-institution that 
regulates the social system. It holds the monopoly on the production of laws and the use of 
force, whose control and administration is disputed by various social groups, some of which 
are organized into political forces subject to electoral scrutiny.  
In treating the state as a meta-institution, I assume that it emerges from the interaction 
amongst individuals and diverse organizations (parliament, ministries, courts, the police, 
etc.). In the course of history, individual interactions consolidated the specific norms and 
social relations of this meta-institution which, once emergent, guarantee the interdependent 
autonomy amongst different types of state organization, as well as its systemic nature. In 
contrast to public choice theory (Buchanan & Tullock, 1958), this text assumes that the 
rationality of civil servants and holders of political office, like that of other human beings, 
results from a complex of reasons and emotions that is far from being systematically selfish. 
The motivations of political agents are multiple and influenced by the national culture, by 
the culture of the organizations to which they are bound, by the exercise of power, by 
material interests, and also by altruistic interests, as with most citizens.
14
  
                                                 
14
 For a critique of rational choice theory, see Archer (2000) and Joas (1996). For a critique of public choice 
theory, see Udehn (1996).  
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An institutionalist recognises that the state is not a neutral guardian of the general 
interest, nor has unlimited capacities to acquire all the knowledge that it needs to formulate 
policies or enforce them. However, accepting the limitations of civil servants, political 
leaders and state organizations does not imply accepting the thesis put forward by Mancur 
Olson (1965), for whom the state is, by nature, captured by economic interest groups 
(Mayhew, 2001). On the contrary, historical evidence shows that development processes 
were supported by states that also made wrong decisions and had bureaucracies that were 
far from perfect. As Chang aptly notes ;ϮϬϬϵ: ϭϵͿ, ͞IŶ the ƌeal ǁoƌld, suĐĐessful ĐouŶtƌies aƌe 
the oŶes that haǀe ŵaŶaged to fiŶd ͚good eŶough͛ solutions to their political economy 
problems and went on to implement policies, rather than sitting around bemoaning the 
iŵpeƌfeĐt Ŷatuƌe of theiƌ politiĐal sǇsteŵ.͟15  
Even if we consider only production and exchange, the view of the market presented here 
goes far beyond the idea of a process of competition between firms through price. Since 
Alfƌed Maƌshall͛s analysis of ͚iŶdustƌial distƌiĐts͛, ǁe kŶoǁ that competition has always 
coexisted with entrepreneurial cooperation. Thus, the institutionalization of a culture of 
trust, favourable to cooperation, is an integral part of the informal norms that regulate the 
functioning of prosperous markets. Indeed, cooperation between companies, and between 
these and the state, is well documented in LazoŶiĐk͛s research (1991) on industrial 
development processes in the USA and Japan. By contrast, on the deregulation of markets, 
intensified after the ϭϵϳϬs, ChaŶg Đlaiŵs that, ͞ǁhile theƌe aƌe soŵe Ŷotaďle seĐtoƌal 
success stories, at least when seen from a static efficiency point of view, the often-expected 
dynamic benefits of deregulation at country-wide level do not seem to have materialised in 
any great quantity in most countries͟ (1997: 715-6).  
As it is based on the interaction between markets and the other institutions in society, 
the political economy of Original Institutionalism is intrinsically sociocultural and historical. It 
is not reducible to an analysis of individualistic economic calculation centred on transaction 
costs and static efficiency gains, the aŶalǇtiĐal tools WilliaŵsoŶ͛s Neǁ IŶstitutioŶalisŵ (1975) 
uses to discuss the nature of firms and markets. Original institutionalism broke with 
calculative reasoning, the concept of market equilibrium and the sterile simplism of 
                                                 
15
 In oǀeƌǀaluiŶg ͞state failuƌes,͟ mainstream economic theory has rejected the active role of the 
developmentalist state and, in its place, defended a regulatory state. This option has been argued in terms of 
static efficiency, concentrating on short-term results that are generally small and non-repeatable. At the same 
time, it ignores long-term results, particularly in productivity and growth.  On this debate, see Chang (1997). 
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algebraic formulas. Instead, it opens up a dialogue with the human sciences and with other 
fields of social science research.   
The renewal of Original Institutionalism argued for here views economic development as 
a historical process of change in the structures of the economy, society and the 
interdependent relations that sustain them. Instead of seeking analogies with biology – one 
of VeďleŶ͛s weak points which persists today in the work of some of his followers (Hodgson, 
2004) – it is argued that institutionalist political economy should rather deepen the 
interdisciplinary dialogue and value the historical dimension of its object of study, paying 
particular attention to the German Historical School, for which Veblen had high regard.  
 
Conclusion 
The form of Original Institutionalism that I support views markets as (meso) institutions 
integrated into the economy as institution, in constant interaction with the other institutions 
of society, particularly with the meta-institution of the state. This leads to a new way of 
approaching state economic policy, which may be illustrated with a short note about the 
role of industrial policy in development processes.  
Industrial policy has been described as a selective, arbitrary policy that provides financial 
support to some large companies or industries that the state defines as possessing high 
growth potential, sometimes in contradiction to their actual performance. Based on the 
existence of state failures, some have argued for a policy of indirect support, especially as 
regards education, R&D and infrastructure expenses. As we have seen, the interactivist 
perspective of the relationship between the state and markets is more demanding.  
The experience of the new industrialized countries shows that industrial policy is based 
on the strategic cooperation between the state and enterprises, chosen from a relatively 
opeŶ uŶiǀeƌse ;͞taƌgetiŶg ǁithiŶ uŶiǀeƌsalisŵ͟Ϳ ;ChaŶg, ϮϬϬϵ: ϭϱͿ. The success of these 
countries confirms that a relatively selective industrial policy, when directed towards 
capability building, is a powerful tool for economic development. Instead of distributing 
fiscal and financial benefits across industries, the interactive model proposes the creation of 
inter-institutional conciliation platforms involving public agents and entrepreneurs from 
specific industries with the goal of carrying out a common strategy. The aim of this process is 
to identify the obstacles to development raised by the culture of industry, by the training of 
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workers and by the skills of entrepreneurs and state officials.  More precisely, what needs to 
be discussed in the dialogue between the state and industry is the following:  
;iͿ eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhǇ is, oƌ isŶ͛t, iŶdustƌial poliĐǇ ŵoƌe diffiĐult thaŶ otheƌ poliĐies?; ;iiͿ if it is ŵoƌe 
difficult than other poliĐies, ĐaŶ it ďe ŵade ͞easieƌ͟ ďǇ leaƌŶiŶg fƌoŵ ͞ďest pƌaĐtiĐes͟? ;iiiͿ if it 
is not capabilities in mainstream economics, what exactly are the bureaucratic capabilities that 
are needed for good industrial policy?; (iv) how can we build those capabilities most quickly 
and cheaply? (Chang, 2009: 24-25) 
The critics of an industrial policy of a developmentalist state will be tempted to raise the 
following question: how is it possible that politicians and ministry staff, without any business 
experience, are in a condition to discuss with entrepreneurs a strategy for their industry? 
Actually, the interactivist model of economic policy starts from a more realistic 
understanding of what knowledge is: it is not something that one does (or does not) have, 
but rather a personal capacity that is developed through social interaction.  In the process of 
designing an industrial strategy, state agents have certainly a great deal to learn, but the 
same may be said of entrepreneurs. The experience of the newly industrialized countries 
shoǁs that the foƌŵeƌ ͞Đould look at thiŶgs fƌoŵ a ŶatioŶal aŶd loŶg teƌŵ poiŶt of ǀieǁ, 
rather than sectional, short-teƌŵ poiŶt of ǀieǁ͟ ;ChaŶg, ϮϬϬϵ: ϭϲͿ, which is essential when 
the aim is to build individual and organizational capabilities and renovate institutions and 
culture.  
This institutionalist perspective on development compels us to critically challenge the EU 
policies designed to support structural change in the so-Đalled ͞ĐohesioŶ ĐouŶtƌies.͟ In 
Portugal, after more than a decade of massive financial assistance, the problem of the 
external deficit remains, and has given rise to an accumulation of private and public debt 
that has made the country bankrupt. The present Euro-zone crisis makes us realise that the 
EU͛s stƌategǇ to pƌoŵote the ƌeal ĐoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe of these ĐouŶtƌies has ďeeŶ a failuƌe.  
However, it is important to understand that this failure cannot be overcome without a 
revolution in the present legal framework of the EU. Indeed, the letter and spirit of the 
Treaties prevent an industrial policy in the terms mentioned above, at least as regards 
competition and free trade. The truth is that a EU country, particularly if it is in the 
Eurozone, does not have the autonomy to implement a developmental economic policy. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, as ChaŶg ƌeŵiŶds us, ͞PoliĐǇ spaĐe is a ŵatteƌ of ǀital iŵpoƌtaŶĐe. LoŶg-range 
historical records suggest that it has aŶ eŶoƌŵous iŶflueŶĐe oŶ a ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s aďilitǇ to achieve 
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economic development͟ (2005: 19). If this is tƌue, theŶ Poƌtugal͛s integration into the EU is 
at the centre of the crisis in which the Portuguese find themselves today.  
Translated by Karen Bennett 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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